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Abstract
Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs) are the miniature of
normal size PCs, with a very limited computational power.
In this paper, we investigate the security of PDAs when
they are used to perform some cryptographic applications.
In our context, we investigate the computationy = gx
(mod p), for a primep, which is believed to be secure in
the sense of the Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) as-
sumption. To be more precise, knowing onlyp, g and y,
it is hard to derivex. We note that this computation is
the most important operation in most cryptographic algo-
rithms. However, due to the limited computational power
of PDAs, such computation requires some amount of time
(and battery life). We show that by observing one of these
parameters, we can reduce the hard problem of DLP to be
predictable, and hence it is not secure. We also show how
to securely generate these kind of computations with PDAs
by employing some different techniques, so that they will
not reveal any additional information to a passive eaves-
dropper. In contrast to previous works, we do not assume
that the attacker can take the full control of the PDA. This
assumption is only applicable to a smart card whenever it
is used in a malicious smart card reader.
Keywords: Network Security, Mobile Computing, Per-
sonal Digital Assistant, Fast Exponentiation
1 Introduction
Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs) have become an
important part of our life. Currently, PDAs can perform
the same operations as normal personal computers (PC),
but they are more desirable as their small size means they
fit in a pocket [24]. The recent trend is for users to use
PDAs instead of a laptop. Thus there is a real need to
make PDAs more useful for electronic commerce applica-
tions.
We note that there were several previous works that at-
tempted to connect PDAs to PCs to assist them to perform
some “heavy” computations, for example [6]. However,
due to the recent development of PDAs, for example the
new Intel XScale processor with 400 MHz, it is possible
for PDAs to perform such computations by themselves.
The problem with connecting PDAs to normal PCs is the
fact that the PCs are nottrusted[6], and therefore, some
securechallenge-responseprotocols are required to en-
able the PDA to perform such computations. This will
of course generate some overheads, in terms of compu-
tations and communications generated by the protocols.
Moreover, due to their mobility, it is desirable for PDAs to
perform any computation by themselves without involving
any additional PC.
We only consider the Pocket PC environment (also
known as Windows CE) in this paper. However, an ex-
tension to another operating system such as Linux (used
in Yopi [28] and Sharp’s Zaurus [23]) is straightforward.
In this paper, we are interested in using PDAs with a
basic cryptographic calculation, i.e. the use of thesquare-
and-multiplyalgorithm to findy from y = gx (mod p).
For a complete survey on Fast Exponentation algorithms,
we refer the reader to [11]. We are interested to know
whether there is any relation between the time (or the bat-
tery life) taken to perform the computation and the secret
1
value (namelyx), which isx = logg(y). The result is sur-
prisingly predictable and it shows that using the square-
and-multiply algorithm on a PDA is not secure. This basic
cryptographic computation is the most important opera-
tion required in most cryptographic algorithms (for exam-
ple, Diffie-Hellman key exchange algorithm [9], ElGamal
encryption algorithm [10], etc.).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the
next section, we briefly describe some related background
information on PDAs and the Discrete Logarithm Prob-
lem (DLP) related to our purpose. In section 3, we show
the results of our experiment and point out the insecurity
of the square-and-multiply operation in a PDA. In section
4, we discuss several other techniques that could be used
to achieve secure computation on a PDA. Section 5 con-
cludes the paper. In the Appendix, we list the results of
our experiment.
1.1 Notations
The ring of integers modulo an integerp is denoted by
Zp, and its multiplicative group, which contains only the
integers relatively prime top, byZ∗p . |x|2 denotes the size
of x in its binary representation.⌊x⌋ denotes the largest
integer that is≤ x.
1.2 Our Contributions
In this paper, we show that applying the square-and-
multiply algorithm to computegx (mod p) will reveal
some information to a passive attacker who can measure
the time taken to perform such computation. We also show
that battery consumption could reveal similar information.
We argue that this measurement can be done efficiently
when the device uses wireless connections, such as Blue-
tooth or Wireless LAN, and the connection has not been
properly configured. We also show a way to securely com-
pute this value on a PDA by using techniques other than
square-and-multiply.
2 Related Information and Background
In this section, we briefly give an overview of a PDA,
and in particular a Pocket PC device. We also describe the
primitive cryptographic calculation that we are interested
in exploring, together with some previous works.
2.1 Pocket PC PDA
Pocket PC is a new operating system, which is not a
port from Windows NT or Windows 9x [19]. The Win-
dows CE (or Pocket PC) APIs are modeled after those of
Windows NT, but internally Windows CE is a new code
base. The Pocket PC operating system is the operating
system that is used in a Pocket PC PDA. The current
release is Pocket PC 2002, named after its predecessor,
Pocket PC 2000 (also known as Pocket PC 3).
There are four main types of Pocket PC hardware,
namely Palm-size Pocket PC (Ps/PC), Pocket-size Pocket
PC (P/PC), Handheld PC (H/PC) and CEPC (a standard
desktop PC running Windows CE). Starting from Pocket-
size Pocket PC version 1.1 (equipped with Windows CE
2.11), a standard Windows CE device supports the ADO,
MFC, ATL and eVB code [19]. The standard processor
used in the current Pocket PC device is a Strong ARM
which runs at 206 MHz. The latest processor is an Intel
XScale processor which runs at 400 MHz, but unfortu-
nately the current Pocket PC 2002 operating system has
not been optimized to use this ability.
A Pocket PC device can be synchronized with a desk-
top PC through synchronization software called “Ac-
tiveSync”. The synchronization can be done through ei-
ther a serial port, a USB port, an infrared port, a Bluetooth
“virtual” port or a network (Ethernet connection) and Re-
mote Access Service (RAS) server. ActiveSync serves
four major purposes: data synchronization, file manage-
ment, file backup and software installation.
2.2 Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) As-
sumptions and the Square-and-Multiply Al-
gorithm
One of the most important cryptographic assumptions
used in the construction of several cryptosystems is the
Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) Assumption, which is
defined as follows [25].
Problem Instance. I = (p, α, β), wherep is prime,α ∈
Zp is a primitive element andβ ∈ Z∗p .
Objective. Find the unique integera, 0 ≤ a ≤ p−2, such
thatαa ≡ β (mod p). In other words,a ≡ logα(β).
It is well-known that this problem is considered to
be intractable [25]. The DLP assumption has been used
to create several cryptosystems, including the ElGamal
[10] cryptosystem. This intractability assumption has also
been used to create signature schemes, such as fail-stop
signatures [27] and undeniable signatures [7]. It is also
used to create a server-aided computation [3], such as the
one proposed in [6]. Maurer and Wolf [17] proved that
the Diffie-Hellman problem and the DLP are polynomial-
time equivalent in a cyclic groupG of order|G| =
∏
peii ,
where all the multiple prime factors of|G| are polynomial
in log|G|.
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It is predicted in [16] that the size of the Discrete Log-
arithm field that is used in DLP must be at least 1881 bits,
to make it secure until the year 2020. It is also noted that
the size of subgroup DLP must be at least 151 bits to make
it secure for the same duration.
The common way to computey = gx (mod p) is by
using a technique that is known as “square-and-multiply”
[25]. This method reduces the number of modular mul-
tiplications required to computegx (mod p) to at most
2ℓ, whereℓ = |x|2. The method is illustrated as follows.
Algorithm 2.1: SQUAREANDMULTIPLY (g, x, p)
comment:Computegx (mod p)
z ← 1









then z ← z ∗ g (mod p)
In the above algorithm, the exponentx is represented in







wherexi = 0 or 1, for 0 ≤ i ≤ ℓ− 1.
We note that in Algorithm 2.1, the number of squarings
is |x|2. The number of modular multiplications is equal to
the number of 1s in the binary representation ofx. This al-
gorithm is well-known and is the most common algorithm
used to computegx (mod p). For the complete history
of this algorithm, we refer the reader to [14].
It is noted in [8] that the time required for the multipli-
cation part of the algorithm is constant, independent of the
factors, except that if the intermediary result of the mul-
tiplication is greater than the modulus, then an additional
reductionhas to be performed at the end of the multiplica-
tion. That means that for some factors, the multiplication
time will be longer than for others. Knuth [14] gives a
right-to-left version of the algorithm, which has the ad-
vantage of not needing to knowℓ ahead of time. Several
other methods could be used to compute the above oper-
ation. For a complete survey, we refer the reader to [11]
.
2.3 Related Works: Side-Channel Attacks
An important related work is the concept introduced by
Kocher which is known as the “Timing Attack” [15]. He
showed that an attacker may be able to find fixed Diffie-
Hellman exponents, factor RSA keys, and break other
cryptosystems, by only observing the amount of time re-
quired to perform private key operations [15]. In general,
this is known as the “side-channel attack”. Although the
result presented in his paper is quite theoretical, Kocher
gave the basic idea that it is possible to exploit some se-
cret elements of the system by measuring time taken. The
main problem with his approach is the fact that the at-
tacker must have a very good knowledge of the imple-
mentation of the system he is attacking. The first practical
attack was described at the rump session of Crypto ’97 by
Lenoir. Another practical implementation of a timing at-
tack was described in [8], which was proposed with the
implementation on a smart card. The error correction that
could be used to improve the result of [8] was proposed in
[12].
In [15], Kocher mentioned several countermeasures to
prevent timing attacks. The straightforward solution is to
make all operations take exactly the same amount of time.
However, this method is not practical. A better solution
is to use a blinding method [8]. Joye proposed several
techniques to prevent timing attacks [13] in a smart card.
Kocher et al. introduced another kind of attack, known
as power analysis attack [21, 22]. Power analysis attacks
work by measuring the power consumption of a tamper-
resistant device when it performs the cryptographic op-
erations. Power analysis attacks fall into two basic cat-
egories. One is Simple Power Analysis (SPA), and the
other is Differential Power Analysis (DPA).
We note that most of the work was introduced mainly
to examine the security of symmetric key cryptographic
algorithms. For example, the analysis of the Digital En-
cryption Standard (DES) and the Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES) [20] were described in [22] and [5], re-
spectively. The work on the power analysis attack on the
public key algorithm was introduced in [26]. More specif-
ically, Messerges et.al. [26] tried to attack the modular ex-
ponentiation in a smart card. This is closely related to our
work, however [26] assumed that the attacker has the full
control over the smart card when it is used. The attacker
owns the malicious smart card reader to enable his mali-
cious side channel attack when the smart card is used in
the reader. We cannot make this assumption in this work
since the PDA does not need to be connected to any other
peripheral when it performs the cryptographic algorithm.
We would also like to highlight that the work on smart
cards is completely different to the one that we are inves-
tigating. A PDA (or a handheld device, in a more gen-
eral term) has more computational power compared to a
smart card [4], and therefore, it is desirable to allow a PDA
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to perform some cryptographic computations without the
need of an untrusted/trusted PC.
3 Experiments with Square-and-Multiply
Algorithm in PDAs
In this section, we describe our test bed experiment
to computegx (mod p) in a PDA. For the first experi-
ment, we are interested in the time taken to complete such
a computation on a PDA. We investigate the relation be-
tween the time taken to perform such a computation, since
a PDA has a very limited computational power, and the
secret exponentx. The result is surprising since we can
estimate the secret exponentx that is used in the com-
putation by only observing the time taken to perform the
computation. We note that this result is not applicable
when the computation is performed in a PC. We also ex-
tend our experiment to measure the battery life of a PDA,
which also produces some similar results. The details of
the experiment and the result are illustrated in Figure 2.
The complete result of our experiment will appear in the
final version of this paper.
3.1 Experiment Settings
We conducted an experiment with an iPaq Pocket PC
H3630, which has a Strong Arm processor running at 206
MHz. The program, written in Embedded Visual C++,
computesy = gx (mod p) and records the time taken to
perform this computation. The computation is done using
the square-and-multiply method given in Algorithm 2.1.
3.2 Experiment Results
As a result of the experiment, we captured the time
elapsed for every possiblex in Zq. We include some
results of the experiment in the Appendix for complete-
ness. In the experiment, we found an interesting relation
between the time elapsed and the number of squarings and
multiplications that were performed. To make our expla-
nation clearer, some sample data and results are listed in
Figure 2 (Note:s is the total number of squarings, andm
is the total number of multiplications).
From now on, lets denote the number of squarings (the
third column in the table above), letm denote the num-
ber of multiplications (the fourth column), lett denote the




Based on our observations, we conclude that the fol-
lowing equation applies
(s + m− 1) ∗ 1000 ≈ T
To be more precise, we obtain




Hence, by observing the time required to perform the
computation, we can estimate the number of squarings
and multiplications that have been performed.
We note thats = |x|2. We also observe thatm ≤ s.
Applying this knowledge to equation (1), we can find the
number of possiblex that satisfy equation (1) (denoted by






























Theorem 3.1 Given the timet (in seconds) taken to com-
















Proof: We know thatm ≤ s, ands = |x|2. We require
that⌊s + m− 1
2
⌋ = t. From this equation, we obtain that
m = ⌊t + 1
2






possible numbers. Since the number
of possibles’s range from⌊ t
2
+ 1⌋ to ⌊t + 1
2
⌋, then there













Incorporating the previous knowledge aboutm, then the
equations are satisfied. 2
Theorem 3.2 Computingy = gx (mod p) in a PDA by
using the square-and-multiply algorithm is not secure.
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Proof: If we can observe the time taken to perform this
computation, sayt, then by using theorem 3.1, we can
find δ possible solutions to the equation. We note that
by knowingp, g andy, together with the knowledge of
δ possible solutions, one can find the uniquex that has
been used in the computation. This contradicts the DLP
assumption and hence this computation is not secure.2
3.3 Extensions
We also conducted similar experiments by observing
the battery consumption that was used to perform the
computationy = gx (mod p) and the result is simi-
lar. We note that in practice, observing the battery life
or the time can be done quite easily, especially if the PDA
is connected to either an Intranet/Internet (via a Wireless
LAN 802.11, for example) or a Personal Area Network
(for example by using Bluetooth). This condition makes
the computation vulnerable against a passive attacker who
only listens to the communication.
4 An Alternative Way to Perform A Secure
Computation on PDAs
We have shown that the use of an efficient square-and-
multiply algorithm to computey = gx (mod p) is inse-
cure. In this section, we discuss several alternatives that
could be used to perform such a computation on a PDA
which would not reveal any additional information to the
attacker. We start our discussion with a trivial scheme
which includes a trusted PC. Then we extend our work
to remove the need of a PC (either trusted or untrusted)
and allow the PDA to perform such computation by itself.
4.1 Client-Server Model with a Trusted PC
The first solution that could be employed is by using a
PC as apartner for a PDA. It means that the PC should
conduct the computation and send the result to the PDA.
This solution is somewhat trivial because the PC must be
trusted with the knowledge of the secret keyx. The sim-
plest protocol is as follows.
PDA→ PC: x, g, p
PC computesy = gx (mod p)
PC→ PDA: y
We note that the above protocol is subject to a man-in-
the-middle attack. However, if the communication is per-
formed by using a secure link, for example by using a
USB/serial cable or a PDA cradle (as illustrated in Figure
1), then the attack is not applicable.
PDA
Serial Connection
Figure 1. Connection to a PC with a serial connec-
tion
We note that this protocol is not applicable in practice.
Normally, a PDA is carried everywhere the owner goes.
With this condition, the protocol requires the PC partner
of the PDA to be carried also, which is impractical.
We also note that if the PDA has set up a partnership
with a PC (via the ActiveSync partnership, for example),
then it is possible to share a long-term secret key on both
sides. With this additional long-term secret key, the se-
cret valuex can be encrypted by the long-term secret key
before it is sent to the PC, and the result should also be
encrypted using the same key. This solution is better than
the previous one, but the security of the scheme depends
on the symmetric key algorithm that is used at both ends.
Although a slight modification using a challenge-response
protocol to obtain a fresh key is possible, it does not add
much security.
As mentioned earlier, this method requires a trusted
PC. With some modification, we can remove the need of a
trusted PC and replace it with an untrusted PC. However,
since the PDA can perform the operation by itself (c.f. a
smart card), we try to find an alternative method which
does not require a connection to a PC.
4.2 A Simple and Secure Scheme on a PDA: The
First Scheme
In this section, we propose a technique that could be
used to compute the above cryptographic operation. This
technique is inspired by [1], together with the basic tech-
nique known as theleft-to-right 4-ary exponentiation[18].
The idea of the method that we use in this section is as
follows. To computegx (mod p), we only need to know
gi (mod p), wherei = 0, 1, · · · , 15. The method works
as follows. Firstly, we convertx to its binary representa-
tion. Then we process each byte (4 bits) starting from its
most significant byte. For each iteration, we use knowl-
edge ofgi (mod p) to find the number represented by
each byte ofx. Then we re-run the iteration until we have
the final result.
Using the above idea, our first scheme is described as
follows.
1. PDA computesyi = gi (mod p), where i =

























Figure 2. Result of Our Experiment
2. PDA computesy = gx (mod p) using the above
knowledge as follows.
(a) PDA convertsx to its binary representation.
(b) PDA uses the knowledge it gains from step 1 to
do the following steps.
i. Let i be the most significant byte ofx (4
bits only). We note thatgi (mod p) is
obtained from the look-up table that is gen-
erated by PDA. Letresult = 1.
ii. If there are any bytes ofx that have not
been processed, then do the following.
A. result = result16 (mod p).
B. result = result · gi (mod p).
C. i← the next byte (4 bits) ofx.
D. Goto (ii)
iii. Return result.
We note that in the first step, the timing attack as we de-
scribed earlier is still applicable. However, in the second
step, the passive eavesdropper cannot launch the timing
attack against the above computation.
Example 4.1 Consider the following toy example. Sup-
pose the PDA wants to computeg220 (mod p). We note
that 220 in binary is11011100. Firstly, the PDA will ob-
tain the knowledge ofgi (mod p) wherei = 1, · · · , 15.
Knowing that the first byte of 220 is1101 (which is 13 in
decimal), the PDA obtainsg13 (mod p) from its look-up
table. Next, the PDA obtains the least significant bytes of
220 (i.e. 1100 or 12 in decimal), and looks up the value
of g12 (mod p). Finally, PDA “combines” the results
by multiplyingg12 (mod p) andg208 (mod p) to ob-
tain g220 (mod p). This operation can be done securely
without any possible timing attack as we described earlier.
Corollary 4.1 A passive eavesdropper cannot learn the
secret,x, used by the PDA by observing the time/battery
that has been consumed.
4.3 The Second Scheme
The technique that we use in this section is inspired
by [2]. We note that this technique is similar to the idea
of addition-subtraction chains described in [11]. We note
that in practice, we will not use a subtraction chain (which
means division) if the operation cannot be performed effi-
ciently. However, in an operation on elliptic curves, the
division is easy and therefore including the subtraction
chain will not significantly increase the computation cost.
1. PDA selects n random numbers,
R = {r1, r2, · · · , rn ∈ Z}, where
∑
i∈n










Lemma 4.1 The above interaction is sound.
Proof (sketch): Because
∑
i∈n ri = x (mod q), and
yi = g









= gx (mod p)
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Example 4.2 Consider a toy example, where the PDA
would like to computeg30 (mod p). The protocol is il-
lustrated as follows.
1. PDA selects 5 numbers:{2, 3, 5, 7, 11}.
2. PDA computesyi = gxi (mod p), wherex =
{2, 3, 5, 7, 11} and gain the knowledge{yi}.
3. PDA has the knowledge ofg2 (mod p), g3
(mod p), g5 (mod p), g7 (mod p) and g11
(mod p). Then, PDA computes
ỹ1 = g
2 · g3 · g7 (mod p)
ỹ2 = g
5 · g5 · g−1 (mod p)
ỹ = ỹ1 · ỹ2 · ỹ2 (mod p)
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4. PDA has successfully computedg30 (mod p).
In the above example, a passive attacker could find out
that there were three multiplications performed in the last
step for eachyi. However, it is not possible for him to
discover the exponent that was used in the above compu-
tation.
Theorem 4.1 Using the above protocol, the timing attack
proposed in the earlier section will not be effective.
Proof (sketch):The timing attack proposed earlier is only
effective when square-and-multiply is used. In the above
protocol, the PDA does not use this method to compute
the final result, and therefore the attack will not work.2
5 Conclusions
We have described the result of an experiment which
shows the insecurity of a PDA to conduct some computa-
tion likegx (mod p). We showed that by only observing
the time required to perform such computation (or the bat-
tery life), we could derive the secret value that was used in
the computation. We do not assume that the attacker has
the full control over the PDA (c.f. [26]). We suggested
several other methods to perform such a computation se-
curely on a PDA. Our methods do not require any help
from a normal PC.
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